{"id":16627,"date":"2026-01-18T07:44:09","date_gmt":"2026-01-18T07:44:09","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/roydadnaft.ir\/English\/?p=16627"},"modified":"2026-01-18T07:44:09","modified_gmt":"2026-01-18T07:44:09","slug":"oils-problem-isnt-iran-or-russia-its-too-much-oil","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/roydadnaft.ir\/English\/16627\/","title":{"rendered":"Oil\u2019s Problem Isn\u2019t Iran or Russia \u2014 It\u2019s Too Much Oil"},"content":{"rendered":"<div class=\"entry-content\" itemprop=\"description\"><p><span class=\"pre-content-text\"><a style=\"color: #0038a8;\" href=\"https:\/\/roydadnaft.ir\/English\/\">RoydadNaft &#8211; <\/a><\/span>\u00a0Crude oil prices have retreated after a brief spike driven by speculation over potential U.S. military action against Iran. Brent and WTI benchmarks hit multi-month highs amid tensions, but they quickly gave way as the market refocused on fundamentals: the world simply has too much oil.<\/p>\n<p>The core thesis of the article is that oversupply dominates the narrative, overriding short-term geopolitical risks from Iran, Russia, and other players. Major forecasters agree that global supply significantly exceeds demand, pushing prices lower.<\/p>\n<p>Key Fundamentals Driving the Bearish Outlook<\/p>\n<p>\u2022<span class=\"Apple-converted-space\">\u00a0 <\/span>Goldman Sachs recently revised its 2026 forecasts downward, citing rising global oil stocks and a projected 2.3 million barrels per day (mb\/d) surplus in 2026. The bank expects even lower Brent prices to curb non-OPEC supply growth and support demand \u2014 unless major disruptions or OPEC cuts occur.<\/p>\n<p>\u2022<span class=\"Apple-converted-space\">\u00a0 <\/span>Global inventories are elevated, with 1.3 billion barrels of crude on water in December 2025 \u2014 the highest since the 2020 pandemic lockdowns (per Kpler data).<\/p>\n<p>\u2022<span class=\"Apple-converted-space\">\u00a0 <\/span>The U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) and International Energy Agency (IEA) both forecast continued supply growth, even as OPEC has paused unwinding its 2022 production cuts.<\/p>\n<p>\u2022<span class=\"Apple-converted-space\">\u00a0 <\/span>U.S. shale production is expected to flatten in 2026 and decline into 2027, but the market has largely ignored this slowdown, fixated on the current glut.<\/p>\n<p>\u2022<span class=\"Apple-converted-space\">\u00a0 <\/span>The U.S. has begun selling seized Venezuelan crude (first batch worth $500 million), adding more barrels to the market \u2014 though industry executives caution that a rapid revival of Venezuelan output is unlikely due to infrastructure challenges.<\/p>\n<p>Geopolitical Factors: Risks Linger but Haven\u2019t Overpowered the Glut<\/p>\n<p>Geopolitical tensions provided temporary bullish support but failed to sustain it:<\/p>\n<p>\u2022<span class=\"Apple-converted-space\">\u00a0 <\/span>Iran: Protests and signals from President Trump about possible strikes caused the initial price jump. However, reports that the Iranian government was easing its crackdown reduced the likelihood of U.S. military action, triggering the retreat. Potential disruptions to Iranian oil exports remain a concern, but they haven\u2019t materialized strongly enough to counter oversupply fears.<\/p>\n<p>\u2022<span class=\"Apple-converted-space\">\u00a0 <\/span>Russia: The EU plans to lower its price cap on Russian oil to $44.10 per barrel starting next month to further squeeze revenues. Previous caps have had limited impact on Russia\u2019s budget.<\/p>\n<p>\u2022<span class=\"Apple-converted-space\">\u00a0 <\/span>Venezuela: The U.S. \u201ceffective takeover\u201d of aspects of the industry (including sales of seized oil) adds bearish pressure, but quick production ramps are doubted.<\/p>\n<p>\u2022<span class=\"Apple-converted-space\">\u00a0 <\/span>Other disruptions: Drone strikes on Black Sea tankers and a reported 35% drop in Kazakhstan\u2019s output in early January (linked to attacks on the Caspian Pipeline Consortium) raised supply worries, but these haven\u2019t shifted the broader glut narrative.<\/p>\n<p>A notable caveat: A significant portion of the \u201cfloating\u201d oil (about a quarter) comes from sanctioned producers like Russia, Iran, and Venezuela. This oil takes longer to sell due to sanctions but eventually finds buyers (e.g., via China, which hit record oil imports in December 2025 and for the full year). This suggests tanker data may overstate the true physical glut.<\/p>\n<p>Overall Market Sentiment<\/p>\n<p>The article concludes that predicting oil prices is especially unreliable right now, with conflicting geopolitical risks and fundamental oversupply clashing. So far, the \u201ctoo much oil\u201d story holds sway, keeping downward pressure on prices despite lurking threats.<\/p>\n<p>As of mid-January 2026, Brent crude has fluctuated around $63\u2013$64 per barrel after dropping sharply earlier in the week on eased Iran strike risks (with some reports showing levels near $60\u2013$63). This aligns with the piece\u2019s description of a retreat from geopolitics-driven highs.<\/p>\n<div class=\"post-date no-social-btn post-updated\">Updated on<time class=\"updated dt-updated\" itemprop=\"dateModified\" datetime=\"2026-01-18T07:44:09+00:00\"> 18 January 2026<\/time><\/div><\/div>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"Crude oil prices have retreated after a brief spike driven by speculation over potential U.S. military action against Iran. Brent and WTI benchmarks hit multi-month highs amid tensions, but they quickly gave way as the market refocused on fundamentals: the world simply has too much oil.","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":16628,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":[],"categories":[47,46,36,19,16,35],"tags":[],"services":[],"class_list":["post-16627","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-breaking-news","category-international","category-lastnews","category-news","category-oil","category-topnews"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/roydadnaft.ir\/English\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/16627","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/roydadnaft.ir\/English\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/roydadnaft.ir\/English\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/roydadnaft.ir\/English\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/roydadnaft.ir\/English\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=16627"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/roydadnaft.ir\/English\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/16627\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/roydadnaft.ir\/English\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/16628"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/roydadnaft.ir\/English\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=16627"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/roydadnaft.ir\/English\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=16627"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/roydadnaft.ir\/English\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=16627"},{"taxonomy":"services","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/roydadnaft.ir\/English\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/services?post=16627"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}